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ABSTRACT 
 The Cyber Automated Red Team Tool (CARTT) is designed to address the 
shortage within the Department of Defense (DoD) of trained red teams that are able to 
conduct security assessments of cyber systems. CARTT, implemented in software, 
simulates the actions of a red team by automatically identifying and analyzing 
vulnerabilities in computer systems, and then exploiting those vulnerabilities with 
cyber-attack actions. It then presents the user with a summary of the results after it 
conducts its assessment. An ongoing project at NPS has developed the first version of a 
CARTT, which can conduct vulnerability assessments of computers. This research has 
extended the capability of the CARTT graphical user interface (GUI), and software to 
enable an operator to select and automatically execute scripted red team attacks against 
specified targets to achieve intended cyber effects. The automated nature of these attack 
scripts allows their use by operators who do not have extensive training in offensive 
cyber operations (OCO) or red teaming. 
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The Department of Defense (DoD) relies on many advanced automated systems to 
operate in environments that are increasingly threatened by cyber-attacks. These advanced 
systems are also increasing in complexity to meet the performance requirements of the 
DoD force. Information must travel almost instantly from the decision makers to the 
execution officers in each battle domain. As a result, the required automation and 
interconnectivity of DoD computer systems to enhance performance has also increased the 
attack surface of these systems.  
Cyber threats against these systems also continue to increase. With the 
interconnectivity of networks, threat actors can seek entry into DoD networks by secondary 
and tertiary methods (e.g., commercial network service providers or third-party vendors). 
Nation-states like China and Russia continue to be a persistent cyber threat to DoD 
networks and systems in search of vulnerabilities to exploit. These countries, among others, 
continue to sharpen their cyber skills and are increasingly becoming more difficult to 
defend against. As a result, DoD must remain proactive against cyber threats by 
discovering and addressing vulnerabilities in systems. These systems must be tested 
throughout the procurement process and after being deployed in operational environments.  
The increased use of automated cyber systems has also increased the demand for 
red teams to perform vulnerability assessments against these systems. The DOT&E 
Cybersecurity report for 2018 emphasized the need for “all systems that transmit, receive, 
or process electronic information” to receive operational tests and evaluations. The report 
also noted that “the increased demand coupled with the increase in data from the tests is 
stressing the test community’s cybersecurity resources.” The DoD has acknowledged the 
shortage of red team experts to conduct such assessments [1].  
A further challenge is that many of the automated systems are not directly 
connected to the Internet. Thus, assessing a particular system across the Internet would not 
be feasible. The DoD would need to deploy red teams to onsite locations for vulnerability 
assessments of its cyber systems. This strain on already limited expertise and resources is 
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not maintainable. Additionally, the time required to recruit and train new personnel at a 
level expected of red teams (e.g., formal classroom and on-the-job training) can take years. 
A low-cost portable cyber tool designed to perform cyber security vulnerability 
checks by a novice user would be ideal. Such a tool would have the capability to connect 
to systems regardless of location. A cyber tool with the capability to simulate cyber-attacks 
would serve as an additional resource to address the rapid increase in demand. To address 
the shortage of red team experts, the tool also should have an interface that provides 
feedback so that it can be operated by a non-expert user. The training time required to 
employ this tool would be measurably less compared to traditional red team training. An 
added benefit is that local DoD sites can implement a continuous and repeatable strategy 
for assessing the vulnerability of their cyber systems. Our goal is to develop a system that 
can conduct red team assessments during development, operational testing, and normal 
field operations of DoD systems. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Hypothesis: The reach of Department of Defense (DoD) Red Teams can be 
significantly expanded by implementation of a portable automated cyber exploitation tool 
developed for non-experts to conduct red teaming activities against computer systems not 
directly connected to an external network. 
1. Primary Question  
How can the capability of the current Cyber Automated Red Team Tool (CARTT) 
be extended to enhance simulated Red Team attacks against specified computer systems 
not directly connected to an external network? 
2. Secondary Question 
How can the CARTT tool be designed so that an operator with minimal training 
use it to conduct red teaming activities? 
3 
B. METHODOLOGY 
We will review commercially available and open source tools such as the 
Metasploit Framework (MSF), Core Impact, and Network Mapper (Nmap) to evaluate their 
individual capabilities in exploiting computer system vulnerabilities (e.g., mapping the 
system, identifying the operating system, finding vulnerabilities), and to test whether they 
can be used for CARTT.  
CARTT will incorporate open source software that executes scripted cyber-attacks 
against a targeted system. The process will not require extensive interaction by the 
operator. The interface design will provide the user with easy to understand graphical user 
interface (GUI) elements to execute commands throughout the process. CARTT will 
provide the user with a list of vulnerabilities and the associated targets. Additionally, a 
window element will display a menu of exploit modules resulting from a selected 
vulnerability by the user. Another window element will provide the non-expert user with a 
description of a selected exploit module. This is so the user may determine if the exploit 
will have the desired cyber effect. A cyber-attack is conducted if the user selects the button 
element to initiate the attack. A window element will provide the user with the status of 
the cyber-attack. 
C. SCOPE 
The goal of CARTT is to implement a portable system that can automate an entire 
cyber-attack scenario (i.e., cyber reconnaissance, vulnerability analysis, cyber-attack, and 
assessment) against computer systems not directly connected to an external network. The 
results can then be interpreted and understood by a non-expert operator. This thesis will 
focus on the development and execution of the cyber-attack phase. Additionally, the GUI 
design will be enhanced to accommodate the extended cyber-attack capability of CARTT. 
The intent is to provide a limited proof-of-concept tool that can behave as a portable 
CARTT. Accessing a computer system from an external network or executing multiple 
attack vectors at once is outside the scope of this thesis. 
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D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This tool will enable the DoD to address the increased demand for cyber Red Teams 
by enabling non-expert operators who do not have extensive training in Offensive Cyber 
Operations (OCO) or Red Team operations to perform continuous assessments of critical 
networks and legacy systems. CARTT is a cyber tool that will enable a vulnerability 
assessment strategy that supplements red teams. This will increase the chance for 
discovering known and potential (zero day) vulnerability threats. Additionally, red teams 
would have more time to focus, plan and portray the capabilities of the advanced persistent 
threat actors. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is organized into the following chapters: 
(1) Chapter II: Background 
Chapter II provides the current state of operational test and evaluation challenges 
of DoD systems and current penetration testing policies. It examines how DoD systems 
are becoming more interconnected and complex, and how these complexities affect 
cybersecurity. Next, current software tools used to exploit vulnerabilities of target 
systems and previous CARTT research are covered. Lastly, a brief overview of the 
CARTT architecture is provided. 
(2) Chapter III: Design Methodology 
Chapter III describes the CARTT design, to include the Metasploit framework, and 
discusses the CARTT process flow, from importing of vulnerability reports to execution 
of a cyber-attack against a specific target. The intuitive nature of the interface design and 
the decision behind expanding the GUI are also presented. Finally, GUI operations are 
described and demonstrated in this chapter. 
(3) Chapter IV: System Implementation and Testing 
Chapter IV presents the implementation of the CARTT proof-of-concept and the 
test results of a cyber-attack against a known vulnerable target. The backend applications 
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like Python and Metasploit are discussed in more detail regarding how CARTT executes 
command requests by the user. The TKinter application is discussed including design 
decisions for future expansion capability. Next, the steps to initialize the Metasploit 
framework within Kali Linux for testing and executing a selected exploit in CARTT are 
presented. Finally, the test results from the experiment are presented. 
(4) Chapter V: Conclusion and Future Work 
Chapter V summarizes the research efforts (e.g., expanded capability and GUI 
design) of this thesis. Conclusion to the research questions are provided along with 
successes and limitations of the research. Finally, future work recommendations are 
provided to further improve CARTT capability and performance. 
  
6 
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II. BACKGROUND
Cyber Warfare is generally accepted as its own warfighting domain. The 
Department of Defense (DoD) is taking steps to ensure cybersecurity is not an afterthought 
when it comes to protecting computers, networks and weapon systems. These systems are 
more integrated and networked in order to enhance the warfighting effort. This 
interconnectivity requires that the systems are resilient when faced with cyber-attacks from 
an adversary. The systems need to be constantly assessed before, during and after 
operationally deployed and used by forces in the field. While the DoD has made significant 
improvements with respect to ensuring its systems, challenges and threats still remain from 
advanced persistent adversaries around the world. This chapter presents background 
relevant to this research in cyber security technologies, tools and techniques.  
A. CURRENT STATE OF DOD OPERATIONAL TESTING AND 
EVALUATION 
In 2004, the National Security Agency (NSA) and the military cyber centers 
developed a program to train and certify DoD red teams [2].  This was an attempt to address 
the limited resources available for conducting cybersecurity assessments on DoD assets. 
During the same year, the military service Operational Test Agencies (OTAs) formed a 
working group to identify inexpensive cybersecurity toolkits. Ten years later, in 2014, The 
OSD Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) revised procedures for 
cybersecurity OT&E of acquisition programs to standardize the assessment process [3]. 
The DoD uses cyber red teams to assess the vulnerability of systems during the 
development and operational test phases of the systems acquisition process. DOT&E’s 
2013 Cybersecurity report found that “the majority of cybersecurity problems identified 
during operational testing in FY13 could have been uncovered and resolved in early phases 
of development and testing” [4]. The report also highlighted that many vulnerabilities are 
found well after testing and during fielded operations. Assessments for systems during 
normal fielded operations usually happen once a year, often during a major exercise. 
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DOT&E noted in 2018 that “the demand for cyber expertise to plan and execute 
cyber assessments across the DoD, and for the in-depth analyses of the data produced by 
these events, is rapidly increasing and stressing available resources.” Increased spending 
on development of new cyber connected systems only exacerbated this problem. For 
example, DoD spent over a trillion dollars to develop and maintain its weapons systems in 
fiscal year 2017 [5]. And there is no indication that spending on such systems in the future 
will decrease. These systems are expected to operate as designed and when needed. 
However, with increasing automation and connections to networks, DoD weapon systems 
are not safe from cyber-attacks. Hence, the demand for red teams will remain strong into 
the foreseeable future. To address this increasing need, the Department of the Navy (DoN) 
posted a Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) topic in 2018 for a software tool 
that could simulate red team actions in the assessment of DoD/DoN systems [6]. 
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WEAPON SYSTEMS AND NETWORKS 
The DoD must continue to develop new capabilities to address evolving threats 
around the world. As new technologies are developed, the complexity of these systems 
presents several issues to the DoD, as described in this section. Additionally, the military 
(e.g., Combatant Commanders [COCOMS]) deploys these complex systems in joint 
military and coalition environments. The requirement for these systems to communicate 
with one another increases the risk for cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The challenge is to 
mitigate vulnerabilities before they are leveraged by adversaries.  
1. Complexity and Interoperability
Weapon systems and networks continue to increase in complexity to meet 
performance requirements. Weapon systems may contain multiple smaller embedded 
systems (e.g., radar system, communication system, and flight system). These embedded 
systems come with their separate programming coded and rely on various software to 
integrate the physical and logical control requirements. For example, if the radar system 
on a Naval vessel detects an inbound threat, it may communicate a recommended 
countermeasure against the threat. Connecting weapon systems to other computer systems 
is a result of attempts to address the demand for more information within shorter decision 
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cycles. Due to their interconnectivity, therefore, weapon systems have become vulnerable 
to cyber-attacks. The same is true for networks where DoD contractors connect to these 
networks for information sharing. 
Furthermore, many DoD weapon systems and networks  are supported by 
“commercial and open source software” [5]. The reliance on commercial software ensures 
that future systems and networks will continue to increase in complexity due to 
interoperability issues between different applications and protocols, which can lead to 
network vulnerabilities. The DoD contracts with various vendors to procure hardware and 
software for mission requirements. Additionally, it is known that DoD also employs 
software that may no longer be supported by the vendor; for example, Microsoft Windows 
XP installation on the Navy’s Aircraft Carrier Gerald Ford (CVN–78) is no longer being 
actively supported by Microsoft [7]. The 2012 DOT&E Information Assurance and 
Interoperability report noted that many interoperability issues are not reported, and that 
many users of such systems usually find “workarounds” to continue to be able to 
accomplish the mission [8]. 
Various software and protocol updates can also lead to new cyber vulnerabilities in 
a weapon system or network. These complexities highlight the need for and usefulness of 
an automated cyber tool that can test for such vulnerabilities. 
2. Factors Affecting Cybersecurity
a. Automation and Connectivity
Automation and connectivity are two factors that have an impact on the 
cybersecurity of DoD weapon systems and networks. The military has enjoyed many 
technological advances that provide an advantage over adversaries. However, a DoD 
Defense Science Board report in 2013 stated that automation and connectivity are 
vulnerabilities that allow an adversary to conduct an asymmetric attack [9]. Many systems 
are connected to each other for speed of data and information exchange. This connectivity 
makes it possible for an advance adversary to gain initial access to one system on a network 
and potentially pivot to another system on the same or different network. Further, 
automation is risky because adversaries can inject corrupt data into a system that may 
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produce an incorrect response or reaction due to a lack of or improper security checks in 
the system. Adversaries have access to many commercially available tools that can take 
advantage of this automation and connectivity issue. The more advance threat actors may 
develop their own tools to exploit such vulnerabilities, as well. These factors will continue 
to play a role in how DoD address cybersecurity. 
b. Lack of Prioritization  
According to the Government Accountability Office, cybersecurity was an after-
thought by the DoD regarding weapon systems. The focus was more on Information 
Technology networks. Acquisition program officers and managers did not understand that 
cybersecurity needed to be a priority for weapon systems [5]. As result, the Defense 
department is facing the interoperability challenges mentioned earlier among other factors. 
Cybersecurity of a weapon system needs to be addressed at the beginning of development 
and continue throughout the testing, operational and fielding phases of acquisition. 
c. Cyber Red Team Resources 
The DoD continues to demonstrate that overall cyber readiness is an important 
aspect of defending the nation against cyber threats. The president’s fiscal year 2020 
budget includes a request for $9.6 billion for the DoD to spend on cybersecurity. However, 
a very small percentage appears to be allocated to support cyber red team efforts. For 
example, less than 1% ($75 million) of the fiscal year 2019 budget was allocated toward 
cyber tools, training. Furthermore, Cyber Command still needs to fill 40% of the positions 
at its headquarters to support this effort. 
The increase in demand for cybersecurity testing has also highlighted the shortage 
of cyber personnel with the required expertise. This shortage is a result of the DoD having 
to compete for talent with the civilian sector. Military personnel with cyber expertise can 
obtain a higher salary by working for industry or contracting with the federal government 
to perform the same cybersecurity services. Defense department leadership does not have 
the authority to increase wages or offer higher salaries to servicemembers that have these 
skills in such a high demand area. Of note, the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act 
granted DoD the authority to recruit and retain a Cyber Command Workforce by 
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streamlining the civilian hiring process [10]. The Director Operational Test and Evaluation, 
during the same year, stated the quality of red teams needs to be addressed through 
recruitment and retention efforts [11]. Nonetheless, the department has been slow to 
execute this authority (due to personnel shortages). 
Training and skills development are other factors affecting the cybersecurity of 
DoD systems. Each military service within the DoD provides formal classroom instruction 
on cybersecurity operations to its servicemembers. Following formal instruction, 
servicemembers are expected to fulfill assignments (sometimes referred to as payback 
tours) throughout the DoD. While in these assigned billets, servicemembers also receive 
on-the-job-training, which helps reinforce the formal instruction and increase efficiency in 
the red team performance. Unfortunately, the return on this investment may not manifest 
itself until three to five years, which often exceeds the length of the payback assignment 
[12]. There is a general understanding that servicemembers’ proficiency and knowledge 
improves over time in a particular assignment. However, the Director Operational Test and 
Evaluation noted in 2017 that military members do not spend enough time in a particular 
job to provide the needed continuity and experience in cybersecurity operations [13]. In 
fact, the average tour length for Sailors and Marines is roughly three and a half years [14]. 
After that time servicemembers are required to rotate to another job assignment. 
3. Access Interface Types
Another factor affecting the cybersecurity of DoD networks and weapon systems 
is that automation of these systems requires that they become increasingly reliant on 
connectivity to other devices. The Government Accountability Office noted that DoD 
weapon systems are designed with various types of interfaces [5]. Some of these interfaces 
are noticeable upon a physical inspection while others are not so noticeable. Interfaces can 
be internal and external to the weapon system and can be implemented in hardware 
(Universal Serial Bus and removable storage) or software (applications and programs). The 
more interface points a weapon system has, the greater the potential access points an 
adversary may use to disrupt the integrity of the system. Cybersecurity red teams need to 
have knowledge of the various types of access interfaces. 
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C. PENETRATION TESTING 
Cybersecurity of networks and weapon systems involves a continuous assessment 
process and strategy. One such strategy is penetration testing which assesses the cyber-
security and resiliency of a system. It allows authorized personnel to actively try and gain 
access to a particular system. The organization and penetration testers will agree to 
predetermined rules such as which networks and systems are off limits for the event. 
Penetration testing, however, is not an activity that should be considered in isolation. It 
should be part of an organization’s comprehensive strategy to assess the cyber-security of 
a network. This includes passive vulnerability scans as well. The penetration test can be 
automated or conducting manually. 
Red Teaming is another method in which a system’s cyber-security is assessed. Red 
Teaming and penetration testing are similar in nature. Both are part of a comprehensive 
agenda to test the overall vulnerability of a computer system or network. Penetration testing 
probes for additional vulnerabilities that may not have been previously discovered. Red 
Teaming however takes the additional step of creating system effects from a specific 
adversary’s perspective. Both serve as a validation tool for proving that a security issue is 
real [15]. Paul Paget (Core Security Technologies Chief Executive Officer) and Ron Gula 
(former Tenable Network Security Chief Executive Officer) stated that penetration testing 
helps demonstrate the “implication of an intrusion” [16]. For example, an initial 
vulnerability assessment may identify a vulnerability, however, penetration testing will 
highlight any system impacts. In other words, if the vulnerability is exploited, does the 
system behaves differently. A more important implication may be the type of additional 
access gained by the adversary by exploiting the vulnerability. In this manner, penetration 
testing is used to confirm or validate that a previous vulnerability that was discovered by a 
passive scan does have an impact on the security of a system. Another added benefit is that 
penetration testing can also test the resiliency of a network or computer system. For 
example, if a system detects an intrusion, does it shut down or continue to operate? If the 
penetration test injects malware, the system may crash and need to be rebooted. On the 
other hand, the system may continue to operate in a degraded mode until the restoration is 
possible. Testing may reveal anomalies that were not present before the testing began. 
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Aside from vulnerability confirmation, penetration testing can provide some insight into 
how an attacker may gain access to the system. With such insight, cybersecurity efforts can 
focus on patching and closing those vulnerabilities discovered during penetration testing. 
By implementing penetration testing as part of the overall cybersecurity strategy, 
leadership can prioritize which vulnerabilities to address first and which vulnerabilities 
present no obvious damage or threat to the system. 
Penetration testing does have risks associated with its use as well. The major risk 
associated with penetration testing is the lack of confidence in the test’s ability to not inflict 
damage upon the system being tested. This is another similarity shared with Red Teaming. 
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation noted that Combatant Commanders usually 
place restrictions on red team assessment because of perceived safety and security concerns 
related to the networks [11]. Leaders need to become comfortable with penetration testing 
and red team assessments. This will require continuous education for non-cyber experts on 
the benefits of penetration testing. 
1. DoD Penetration Test Policy
The DoD updated its cybersecurity procedures in 2014 to include forms of Black 
and White box testing throughout the acquisition phases of a system’s development [3]. 
The two assessments types are 1) Cooperative vulnerability and penetration assessment 
and 2) Adversarial assessment. The Cooperative vulnerability and penetration assessment 
are designed to identify errors and vulnerabilities in coordination with the system’s 
program manager and design engineers. During this phase, vulnerabilities can be identified 
and corrected early before reaching the operational and fielding phases. This is a version 
of White box testing because assessors require in depth knowledge of the system being 
tested. Thus, full access to the source code is needed in order to conduct the evaluation. 
Conversely, the Adversarial assessment takes place in an operational environment, where 
the assessors are conducting the evaluation from the end users’ perspective. The assessment 
not only evaluates if the system operates as designed but can it withstand attacks from an 
adversary. This process resembles the Black box testing technique. Simply put, the DoD’s 
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white and black box testing phases are designed to test the systems in the pre-operational 
and post-operational phases, respectively. 
Resources and planning, however, still impact the red teams’ evaluation and testing 
process. The Director Operational and Test and Evaluation found that some programs are 
unable to conduct the white box testing needed in the earlier phases of development to find 
and correct errors. The result is a more compressed timeline making it difficult for red 
teams to perform a thorough analysis of the system during its operational and fielding 
phases. The DoD will benefit from a cyber automated red team tool that can help address 
some of the resource constraints.  
D. RED TEAM TOOLS 
There are several cybersecurity tools available in the commercial market. However, 
most of these tools are designed to remotely test systems over an Internet IP-based 
outward-facing network interface. Furthermore, these tests are mostly focused on 
enterprise information technology (IT) networks, not weapon or other specialized systems. 
Some of these tools offer an open-source platform to support additional code development. 
This feature can enable red teams to incorporate some of the tool’s tactics, techniques, and 
procedures into their testing and evaluation of DoD systems. These cyber tools may also 
allow red teams to automate many of the cyber assessment techniques used to perform 
OT&E. Red teams may also customize the exploit code to address DoD specific system 
cyber-attack concerns. This section discusses some commercially available and open 
source tools that automate cyber-attacks, such as Cobalt Strike, Metasploit and Core 
Impact. A more comprehensive list can be found in Plot’s thesis [17]. 
1. Cobalt Strike 
Cobalt Strike is a web application software simulation tool used to emulate 
adversarial attacks against a specific target. It has a graphical user interface that displays 
the sessions and targets to the user in an easy to understand fashion. Users would need to 
familiarize themselves with the toolbar to better facilitate adversary emulations. This tool 
offers red teams a full range of techniques to select from when designing an attack scenario. 
Such techniques include spear phishing and embedding malicious code inside a document 
15 
as well as red team collaboration capabilities. The red team collaboration allows 
distributive operations across servers. Team members can execute a phishing campaign 
from one server location that references a malicious website at another server location. A 
drawback of this feature is that each server operates independently during the engagement. 
Post engagement reporting is consolidated at the end of the event to provide a complete 
picture of the scenario. Another benefit of Cobalt Strike is that it leverages a Cobalt Strike 
technology known as “Malleable C2” [18]. Malleable C2 allows the red team to alter 
behavior and indicator signatures while conducting cyber-attacks. This prevents 
cybersecurity defenders from using known signatures to quickly identify the type of cyber-
attack emulated by the red team. However, the red team can use Malleable C2 to slightly 
alter a known signature to test how quickly the malicious attack is noticed. The focus of 
Cobalt Strike is to train and enhance the incident response of an organization’s Enterprise 
IT systems. The initial version of Cobalt Strike was built on top of the Metasploit 
Framework (discussed below) however, later versions were separated from Metasploit. 
Cobalt Strike comes at a cost of $3,500 per user for one year. 
2. Core Impact
Core Impact is another web-based automated cyber tool that provides vulnerability 
scanning, penetration testing and after-action reports. Though this cyber tool has a friendly 
user interface, it requires the users to be skilled in conducting penetration testing. It 
emulates adversary cyber-attacks through its multi-vector capability. An “agent” tunnel is 
installed on the target providing remoted access to the system or network. For example, if 
a client on a network opens an attachment inside of an e-mail, the malicious code calls back 
to Core Impact establishing the agent tunnel. These connection tunnels can be encrypted 
but are established in the clear by default. Exploits are executed in Python code and are 
also modifiable by the user. Core Impact allows the user to execute attacks via a “drag-
and-drop” interface [19]. This process increases the number of cyber-attacks that can be 
conducted in a short time period. Red teams are able to pivot between various applications, 
(e.g., web and email). This tool also allows cyber testers to escalate privileges and cover 
their tracks after the attack. Systems are returned to their previous state. Agents can be 
programmed to self-destruct after penetration testing is completed. This option prevents 
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inadvertently leaving a back door for a real adversary to gain access to a system or network 
Core Impact is regarded as the top exploitation tool on the market. It is also among the 
most expensive tools costing $30,000 per year [20].
3. Canvas
Canvas by Immunity Inc. is an automated penetration test scripted in Python. Its 
users must have an extensive knowledge of penetration testing and exploitation techniques. 
During testing, a listener shell is established on the target to receive further exploitation 
commands. Canvas has a feature called “Most definitely” (Mosdef), which is a dynamic 
shellcode generator [21]. This feature allows penetration testers the ability to pivot between 
various host on a network regardless of the different operating systems used [22]. Canvas 
has over 800 exploits but provides limited vulnerability scanning capability. Further, it only 
conducts scans for IP addresses on a given network. Canvas documentation states that the 
platform was designed to facilitate the development of other security products. The 
platform’s MOSDEF session also allows red teams to develop other exploits or payloads 
to attacks systems [23]. Canvas is well-known for providing the ability for 3rd party 
exploitation add-ons. 
4. Metasploit Framework
Metasploit (also known as Metasploit Framework) is an automated open-source 
software platform available to penetration testers. A major benefit of Metasploit is that it 
contains an array of automated modules designed to execute cyber-attacks. Metasploit 
modules contains various software written to execute a particular function (or purpose) 
when deployed against a system or network. The five types of modules are: 1) Exploit, 2) 
Auxiliary, 3) Post-Exploitation, 4) Payload or 5) No Payload [24]. Exploit modules are 
designed to target specific vulnerabilities and gain access. Auxiliary modules perform 
functions such as scanning or denial of service. The post exploitation modules further 
enumerate the target trying to find other avenues to exploit. Exploitation can be executed 
in automatic or manual mode. This gives the user the option of attacking multiple 
vulnerabilities at once or one vulnerability at a time [24]. Another feature of Metasploit is 
Meterpreter. Meterpreter is an advance payload that establishes a command shell and 
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executes inside of memory. This feature makes detecting the Metasploit session harder for 
intrusion detection applications [24]. With Metasploit, penetration testers are able to pivot 
into other processes or sessions to maintain a persistent presence on a system. The 
Metasploit open-source framework is very popular in the cyber development community. 
Penetration testers can modify existing modules or developed new modules in an effort to 
identify vulnerabilities in a system or network. The Metasploit Framework is universal in 
that many security platforms such as Cobalt Strike, Core Impact and Canvas, among others, 
can use Metasploit modules as part of their penetration test events. There are also 
commercial editions of Metasploit beginning from $5,000 per user per year [25]. 
These adversarial simulation tools provide a variety of techniques that may be used 
to assess DoD systems. However, they all assume that the user has extensive knowledge 
of exploits, adversarial attacks, and penetration testing. 
E. RELATED RESEARCH 
Research teams have been experimenting with various models and techniques to 
automate all or portions of penetration testing. One benefit of automation is that it can 
significantly reduce the amount of time needed to conduct an assessment of a system. For 
example, evaluators will not spend time on rote and tedious task. More time will be 
dedicated toward discovering the more difficult vulnerabilities and assessing the system 
impact of those discoveries. This section presents various approaches by researches to 
automate penetration testing. 
1. Penetration Testing in a Box
In 2015, a research team from Northern Kentucky University designed a security 
assessment tool to address the high cost of conducting vulnerability assessments and to 
streamline the process. The researchers acknowledge that penetration testing can be a 
complicated endeavor depending on the complexity of a network. And if an organization 
wanted a more detail assessment, then the price tag would inherently increase [26].  
The “penetration architecture” that the researcher proposes consist of a Pentest Box 
that is positioned behind the firewall of the organization, a computer on the outside of the 
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firewall connected by a Virtual Private Server. The Virtual Private Server will allow for 
the viewing of the vulnerability data via a Secure Shell callback from the Pentest Box to 
the computer located outside of the organization’s firewall [26]. The vulnerability data is 
accessible via a web application hosted on the Pentest Box. The research team relied on 
opensource software as part of the Kali Linux suite (i.e., the Metasploit Framework (MSF), 
Network Mapper (Nmap), and Open Vulnerability Assessment System (OpenVAS)) to 
conduct the experiment.  
The researchers pointed out that the limitations of the Pentest Box is based on 
available resources in terms of hardware, configurations and budgets. The objective of the 
box also factors into its design: 1) only conducts vulnerability scans, 2) cyber (exploitation) 
attacks included in the assessment, and 3) what procedure are automated during the 
assessment [26]. 
2. Automated Network Intrusion Process 
Researchers at the Technical Educational Institute of Crete demonstrated how 
combining opensource tools can be used to automate a cyber-attack across the internet [27]. 
For the demonstrations, the researchers used the MSF, Nmap, and Python to automate the 
process. They showed how an attacker could either initiate an attack on a single target or 
on multiple targets at once “under certain circumstances,” (e.g., the system or network has 
to have a valid vulnerability). 
The experiment was designed with a computer system vulnerable to a Metasploit 
module. The vulnerability (CVE 2009–4188) consisted of a hardcoded account located on 
the 5.5 Tomcat server. The exploit uploaded a JavaServer Page via an http PUT request 
[27]. This action provided a remote shell back to the automated system. The experiment 
highlighted that two Metasploit modules were needed to gain access to the server. After 
gaining access, the researches established a Meterpreter shell session, which allowed them 
to maneuver away from the previously compromised service onto the operating system. 
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3. Automated Attack Model for Red Teams
Three graduate students from the Florida Institute of Technology published an 
article titled “Toward an Automated Attack Model for red teams” analyzing various cyber-
attack models used by red teams [28]. The authors described Red Teaming as a necessary 
process for assessing the vulnerabilities of a system. Plus, it is important to understand how 
a potential adversary may seek to gain entry into a connected system. One issue with red 
teams is that there is no universally excepted method for assessing vulnerabilities within a 
system. Further, the type of red team method is more determined by the requirements and 
terms set by the organization being assessed. Four cyber-attack models were presented 
by the authors: 1) Threat modeling, 2) Attack trees, 3) Collaborative attack modeling and 
4) Insider threat model.
The Threat modeling approach uses dataflow diagrams to illustrate the layout of 
the different components of a particular application or system. The idea is that each 
component of the system is a potential target for an attack by an adversary. For each target, 
the model identifies various cyber-attacks (i.e., denial of service, buffer overflow) that may 
be employed against the target. The targets are then displayed in a decision tree format. 
The path leaving the target represents the decisions an adversary would need to make in 
order to affect that particular target in the software application or system. User of this model 
would need to determine a ranking system for the threats based on priorities that are 
consistent and helps to focus efforts on the more likely threats. The model would also 
provide recommendations for mitigating the potential threats identified. The dataflow 
diagram approach assumes red teams will be able to discover more vulnerabilities as more 
components are added to the diagram. 
The Attack tree model is broken down into three branches: “root,” “leaf” and 
“child” nodes [28]. The cyber-attacker's goal or mission is designated as the root of the 
tree. The leaf is the pathway in which the attacker travels to reach the goal. The actual 
cyber-attacks are represented by the child nodes. In addition, logical symbols such as AND 
or OR can be used to determine the cyber-attack flow. For instance, OR can represent that 
an event will occur because any of the previous “child” steps occurred. Whereas the AND 
logic means that all of the previous “child” steps must occur. Another feature is the value 
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metric. Nodes can contain information like probability, cost or adversary characteristics. 
Having this information facilitates decision regarding the likelihood and resources required 
regarding a particular cyber-attack. Again, this model emphasizes the need for red teams 
to understand the threat in order to assess the security of a system. 
The Collaborative attack model is a hybrid between a decision trees network model 
and a Wiki page. The model uses three terms to describe elements in the model: 
preconditions, transitions and postconditions. Preconditions may describe the state of a 
system or the capability of the adversary. The state of the system can be defined as 
conditions that would make it possible for an adversary to conduct a cyber-attack in the 
first place. Postcondition describes the state of the systems after a system has been 
compromised (i.e., what can the adversary do after gaining access). Like a network, the 
transitions connect the preconditions with the postconditions. The transition is the steps 
taken to maneuver through to the postcondition. Transitions uses the AND logic similar to 
the Attack tree model—all preconditions must be met before transitioning to the 
postconditions [29]. The information is then documented onto a Wiki page with detailed 
information like code or other vulnerabilities that red team members can access, view or 
provide updated information. The Wiki page was designed to allow collaboration with 
knowledgeable professionals as well novice. As such any person can add their experience 
with cybersecurity to the web page. 
The name of the last model, Insider threat model, is self-explanatory. The Insider 
threat model’s point of view is from the access and privileges the user already has to a 
system or network. Red teams would carry out attacks as if they were insiders. Red teams 
would have to assume characteristics of a potential insider (e.g., knowledge, disgruntle, 
malicious intent). The purpose of the model is to document actions that an insider would 
take to exploit a particular system. Further, red teams can use this information to develop 
countermeasures to prevent a would-be adversary from conducting an attack. 
The authors contend that red teams should have quick access to information 
regarding cyber-attacks, the system, the adversary and various countermeasures. They 
propose that the information can and should be automated. The automation method 
recommend by the authors is the use of Unified Modeling Language (UML) for design 
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visualization and Extensible Markup Language (XML) to display the attack and defense 
methods. UML is used by software designers in order to provide greater detail. XML is a 
simple text file used to describe data. The implication is that red team automation would 
be more simplified because these languages are more suitable to programming the 
software. Instead of initially assessing the source code of an application like the Threat 
model, the automated red team model looks at modeling the particular cyber-attack first. 
In other words, what is the intent of the adversary and the capabilities required to conduct 
such an attack. This information is evaluated by the red teams and cataloged into the 
Extensible Markup Language format for automation. Next, the cyber-attack success matrix 
is delineated using UML. The XML text descriptions can be parsed using specific software 
tools to generate code. And the final phase of the model is to develop a countermeasure for 
the cyber-attack. Once the documentation is complete, red teams can review and automate 
the attacks by parsing the XML. 
4. Automatic Executing Penetration Testing
Five researchers at Beihang University located in China developed a penetration 
testing tool called Automatic Executing Penetration Testing (AEPT). AEPT was developed 
to address the high cost of employing penetration testing teams and the inefficiency of the 
penetration tests themselves [30]. The researchers divided penetration testing into four 
stages as adapted from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): 1) 
Planning contained the guidance regarding what is going to be tested and when (i.e., the 
scope of the penetration test); 2) Discovery is the enumerating and vulnerability scanning 
performed on the system or network; 3) The attacking stage is the actual penetration testing. 
This stage also has the capability to provide dynamic feedback to the discovery stage if a 
new vulnerability is found.; 4) The reporting stage provides the final report of the test. The 
researches further divided the stages into two methods: a method to generate the testing 
scheme (planning and discovery) and a method that executes the testing scheme (attacking 
and reporting). Both methods are to be automated in nature. The AEPT uses a complex 
pushdown automata model to automatically generate the testing scheme for which the 
system will execute on the target. The researchers conducted a “proof of reachability” that 
concluded the pushdown automata will reach its final state given a define set of input 
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symbols. The execution method reads in the scheme, sets the exploit module and payload, 
executes the exploit and displays the result. If the exploit fails, the system calls the next 
exploit module and payload and repeats the execution for that particular vulnerability. The 
AEPT also iterates through each vulnerability beginning with the least difficult to the most 
difficult based on a ranking scheme. 
5. Automated Penetration Testing Based on a Threat Model
Although a separate research, two authors, one from Imam Abdulrahman Alfaisal 
University, Saudi Arabia and the other from University of Southampton, United Kingdom 
suggest the development of an algorithm that will automate a penetration test based off of 
a threat model scheme that would be provided [31]. This idea resembles a “hybrid” between 
the previous two researches. The researchers used a threat model from the IT Innovation 
Centre; however, several models exist based on design and objectives that can be used to 
highlight potential cyber-attacks. The automated penetration process proposed follows the 
techniques provided in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800–
115 manual. The design employs a graph format populated with nodes that are linked by 
edges. The nodes represent the systems to be assessed while the edges are various 
relationships between the nodes (i.e., controls, connections and other hosts). The algorithm 
will execute the penetration assessment until each node on the graph has been evaluate 
against the threat model. The complexity of the algorithm depends on the number of nodes 
on the graph. A network with multiple nodes will require a more complex algorithm. 
6. Efficiency and Effectiveness of Penetration Test Automation
Researchers at Dakota State University Madison, South Dakota designed a proof of 
concept tool that automates some frequently used penetration testing tools to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness. The tool is scripted in Python and uses other tools such as 
Nmap, Nessus, and MSF to name a few [32]. The researchers used the Penetration Testing 
Execution Standard (PTES) to validate the proof of concept tool. Specifically, the tools 
focused on automating the information gathering and vulnerability analysis stages of the 
process. The automated tool scanned for IP addresses and web domains returning 
information related to e-mail addresses, document files, hosts and service vulnerabilities. 
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The information is downloaded, parsed and saved to a file for exploitation use later. The 
file is read into Metasploit for exploitation of vulnerabilities identified through the 
information gathering and vulnerability analysis stages. After the exploitation stage, 
Metasploit discontinues the session but leaves open the option for another engagement. 
Research work continues in an effort to improve penetration testing and red 
teaming. assessments. A few academic papers were discussed above, but this area is littered 
with proof of concepts and testing to at least automate the rote methods of identifying 
vulnerabilities and attack schemes. 
F. CARTT ARCHITECTURE 
The Cyber Automated Red Team Tool (CARTT) architecture is composed of open-
source software. CARTT was designed using the Kali Linux distribution platform. It allows 
for vulnerability scanning and penetration testing against systems and networks. CARTT 
was able to conduct vulnerability scans on 100 hosts using the Kali Linux platform [17]. 
Python is the programming language used for CARTT. It is a beginner friendly 
programming language that uses the Tk interface (Tkinter) to display the Graphical User 
Interface (GUI) to the user. This allows the user to select various options to conduct the 
vulnerability assessments of a system. Tkinter also allows for the automation of many 
program commands to be executed behind the seen. The buttons are arranged in a 
sequential manner for ease of execution by the user. The Network mapper (Nmap) and 
Open Vulnerability Assessment Scanner (OpenVAS) are the open-source tools used for 
host discovery and vulnerability analysis of a network, respectively. Finally, the MSF will 
import the results of a vulnerability scan and attempt to conduct a cyber-attack against a 
particular vulnerability. For a more detailed discussion regarding any of the open-source 
tools mentioned above, refer to Plot’s thesis work [17]. 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed factors affecting DoD weapon systems and networks. 
Furthermore, penetration testing was presented to include the advantages and 
disadvantages of the various techniques. Lastly, cyber red team tools and previous research 
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was presented. The next chapter presents the framework for the Cyber Automated Red 
Team Tool (CARTT). 
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III. DESIGN METHODOLOGY
In this chapter, we discuss the design methodology and framework of CARTT. 
Specifically, this chapter describes how CARTT imports vulnerability reports, and 
then allows the user to select various hosts from the report to conduct automated cyber-
attacks against. 
A. TEST DESIGN 
CARTT enables an operator to replicate the actions of cyber red teams by allowing 
the CARTT user to select and automate scripted cyber-attacks against specified targets on 
a network. Figure 1 illustrates a simple network that CARTT can operate on. As discussed 
in Plot’s thesis, the Kali Linux suite is used to implement CARTT host discovery, 
vulnerability analysis, and cyber-attacks methods [17]. The test platform uses the CARTT 
system, along with three target hosts with different operating systems: Linux, Microsoft 
Windows 7 Service Pack 1, and Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 3. For this thesis’ 
proof-of-concept, a test case experiment is conducted to perform a cyber-attack against the 
Windows XP target from the CARTT Kali Linux system. 
Figure 1. Sample Kali Linux diagram layout 
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B. METASPLOIT FRAMEWORK ARCHITECTURE 
The Metasploit Framework (MSF) architecture provides exploit and payload 
modules that users may configure and execute within the framework. Exploit modules are 
comprised of Ruby script commands that perform a sequence of automated steps to exploit 
a vulnerability previously discovered on a target host. Generally, exploit modules are the 
delivery vehicles used to establish the “connection” between the attacker and host target. 
The module options are based on the previously discovered vulnerabilities.  
Once a connection is established through an exploit module, a payload module is 
delivered to the target. Payload modules are Ruby script code (e.g., malware, loaded onto 
a system or network for execution on a target host), potentially allowing the attacker to 
gain further access into a system for post-exploitation activities, such as privilege 
escalation, pivoting, and deeper target analysis. When an exploit is chosen, the MSF 
automatically selects the best payload to be delivered to the target. 
C. CARTT PROCESS FLOW 
CARTT is written in the Python scripting language, and is built on top of the MSF 
architecture. Since MSF (specifically its mfconsole utility) is a command-line intensive 
tool, it can be difficult for inexperience users to become proficient in its usage and full 
capability. To mitigate this shortcoming, CARTT replaces the command-line interface 
(CLI) of MSF with a graphical user interface (GUI) to reduce the knowledge needed by 
the user to perform the procedural steps in a cyber-attack using MSF. To do this, CARTT 
uses resource scripts to automate complex commands that would normally need to be 
entered into a terminal window. CARTT also creates files in the background from the MSF 
results generated by a particular resource code action. This allows CARTT to display the 
MSF results in the GUI for viewing by the user. Figure 2 shows the entire CARTT cyber-
attack process, including identification of vulnerabilities, selection of appropriate exploit 
modules, and launching of attacks. The following paragraphs describe the overall flow 
depicted in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. CARTT flow diagram 
To start the process, CARTT must receive a vulnerability report generated by the 
OpenVAS Greenbone Security Assistant (GSA) during the host vulnerability scan. The 
report is manually downloaded from the GSA GUI into the local file directory. The GSA 
provides various file downloadable formats; for this development, the file format used is 
XML. This is the only manual operation currently performed during the proof-of-concept 
simulation. CARTT then imports the vulnerability report from the local directory into the 
MSF database. Once imported, each vulnerability is displayed in the Host Vulnerability 
Descriptions window on the CARTT GUI. 
Next, the CARTT GUI allows the user to search the MSF database for 
corresponding exploit modules for each of the identified host vulnerabilities. The user is 
allowed to select a particular host and visualize the vulnerabilities identified by the GSA 
vulnerability scan. The user can then select an individual vulnerability to exploit. Once the 
vulnerability has been selected, CARTT searches MSF for a list of exploit modules that 
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may be used to deliver a cyber-attack against the intended host. This list is presented to the 
user for selection.  
CARTT then presents the user with a description of the selected exploit module. 
This assists the user in determining if the selected exploit is the appropriate exploit for the 
identified target host. After the user picks an exploit module and communicates the 
selection to MSF, MSF automatically selects a payload, displays the exploit status in the 
GUI, and waits for the user to initiate the desired cyber-attack. Once the cyber-attack is 
initiated, the CARTT interface provides feedback to the user regarding the status of the 
exploit execution (e.g., if the session failed, or was properly established). 
D. CARTT GUI DESIGN 
The cyber-attack process described in Section 3.C is presented to the user through 
the CARTT GUI. This section describes the key design decisions made in designing 
the GUI. 
With the extended cyber-attack capability, the CARTT GUI has evolved from its 
initial prototype design (Figure 3), however, we have intentionally maintained its 
simplicity to allow its operation to remain intuitive and easy to understand for the user. The 
CARTT GUI, as shown in Figure 4, has a menu of buttons located on the top left side of 
the GUI. Only those buttons which are meaningful at any point in time are activated; the 
rest are disabled. Initially, only the MSF and Quit buttons are available to the user for 
selection. A banner stating “Initialize MSF to begin” is displayed above the buttons to 
prompt the user to begin using CARTT. Otherwise, the user may select the “Quit” button 
to exit CARTT. Underneath the column of buttons are three small windows. These 
windows provide the user a quick snapshot of the network that CARTT is connected to. 
The first window displays the IP address assigned to CARTT while on the network. Second 
displays the network address in Classless inter-domain routing (CIDR) format of the 
network. And third displays the number of hosts that were detected on the network by 
CARTT. Furthermore, immediately below this is a window that list all the hosts in order 
by their IP addresses.  
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Figure 3. CARTT prototype design 
The remainder of the GUI contains windows that display various pieces of 
information dependent on the actions of the user. The initial GUI screen provides a 
description to the user of what information each window provides. For example, “Host 
Vulnerability Descriptions” lists each vulnerability by host. Additionally, if the user were 
to select a host from the ordered hosts list, only the vulnerabilities associated with that host 
appear in the “Host Vulnerability Descriptions” window. On the right side of the GUI, are 
five other windows. The first is an “information bar.” When the user initiates an action 
within the GUI, the GUI provides “feedback” via the bar indicating that the action was 
received and in progress. The three remaining bigger windows are self-explanatory: 1) 
Module List, 2) Exploit Module Description and 3) Exploit Status. The Exploit Status 
window provides the user feedback during the cyber-attack phase. This is where the user 
can determine whether to setup, initiate or terminate the cyber-attack. 
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Figure 4. CARTT with extended cyber-attack capability 
It is worth noting that the command-line interface provides more options for a user 
to interact with MSF. However, the user will need to have a higher level of knowledge of 
MSF and be more familiar with conducting cyber-attacks. The CARTT GUI has been 
designed with a novice operator in mind (i.e., no extensive MSF or networking knowledge 
is expected). 
E. CARTT GUI OPERATIONS 
Once the user has connected to and reviewed the network information, it is time to 
review the vulnerabilities associated with the hosts on the network. The user must click 
the “Generate Vulnerability List” button on the GUI. As stated earlier, for this thesis, we 
will review the vulnerabilities associated with the Windows XP Service Pack 3 machine 
(IP address 10.2.99.86). Figure 5 shows the list of hosts and associated vulnerabilities 
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populated inside the description window. The user may use the scroll bars on the side and 
bottom of the box to either move the window area up, down or side-to-side in order to read 
the vulnerabilities listed inside the window area. 
Figure 5. List of vulnerabilities inside CARTT 
Instead of scrolling through all the vulnerabilities listed, the user can select a 
specific host to populate its vulnerabilities in the window. Figure 6 illustrates the user 
selecting Host 74 with IP address 10.2.99.86. Note that the IP address is also displayed in 
the top right “Host” window. This gives the user a “quick” reference of which host is in 
the CARTT selection for further exploitation. As a result of the selection, the corresponding 
vulnerabilities are listed in the descriptions window located below the hosts. The user can 
scroll thru the list in search of a particular vulnerability for that host. Once the user selects 
a vulnerability from this list, CARTT finds and presents the user with a list of exploit 
modules for the selected vulnerability (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 6. List of vulnerabilities by Host 
Figure 7 lists several exploit modules for the Microsoft Windows SMB Server 
vulnerability. The user can scroll through the list both vertically and horizontally. For the 
MS08-067 Microsoft Server vulnerability, only one exploit module is returned (see Figure 
8). The MS08-067 exploit module will be demonstrated for this thesis project. 
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Figure 7. Multiple modules in list window 
Figure 8. Only one module in list window 
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To assist the user in determining which exploit module to use, CARTT provides a 
description of a selected module. Unlike the previous two GUI windows, the “Exploit 
Module Description” window has only one scroll bar. Since the previous windows’ 
information were an actual list of items, they were designed to display in list format. 
However, the “Module Description” window “wraps” the text in paragraph format for ease 
of viewing and reading by the user. Figure 9 shows the description of the ms08_067_netapi 
exploit module. Note the user will still need to scroll vertically to read the full text. 
Figure 9. Description of ms08_067_netapi exploit module 
The last window of the CARTT GUI is the “Exploit Status” window. This is where 
the user receives feedback regarding the exploit phase of the cyber-attack. After selecting 
the desired exploit module, the user clicks the “Exploit Setup” button. CARTT uses the 
selected exploit module and returns a payload status from the MSF (see Figure 10). The 
user is provided with the type of payload that will be used against the targeted host. CARTT 
also returns confirmation that the proper exploit module and target IP address is as 
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previously selected. Next, the “Run Exploit” button is highlighted giving the user the 
option to initiate the exploit against the target. It is important to note that the user still has 
the option to select another exploit, vulnerability or host at this point in the operation. The 
user would only need to select the preferred item in either of the previous windows. 
 
Figure 10. Exploit setup and preparation 
After initiating the cyber-attack against the target, CARTT will return another 
exploit status. In this experiment, CARTT returns several items in the window. The most 
important being that a “Meterpreter session 1” is open on target IP address 10.2.99.86 (see 
Figure 11). The user now has remote access to the target. Note that the “Terminate Session” 
button is now highlighted on the GUI. Again, the user has the option to initiate another 
exploit against this target. For example, starting another reverse_tcp (Transmission Control 
Protocol) shows a Meterpreter session “2” was open in the Exploit Status window. 
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Figure 11. CARTT established Meterpreter access session 
At this point, the user may choose to disconnect from the target via the “Terminate 
Session” button. This action terminates the cyber-attack. Figure 12 shows the feedback 
acknowledgement in the CARTT GUI window if the user wishes to disengage from the 
cyber-attack. At this point, the user can select another host and explore more vulnerabilities 
or exit from the CARTT process by selecting the “Quit” button. 
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Figure 12. CARTT user terminates cyber-attack against target 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview of the CARTT design and architecture, and its 
use in the cyber-attack process. CARTT imports a GSA vulnerability scan report into MSF, 
then with user input, automates a cyber-attack against a specified host on a target network. 
The goal of CARTT is to support the process in such a way that a non-expert user can 
conduct a cyber-attack and receive feedback regarding its success or failure. The next 
chapter describes the implementation of CARTT and as a proof-of-concept, demonstrates 
its capability employing a realistic cyber-attack, specifically the MSF ms08_067_netapi 
exploit module against a Windows XP target. 
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IV. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION AND TESTING 
The MSF provides two user interfaces for conducting cyber reconnaissance, 
exploitations, and attacks: Armitage and the MSF Console. Armitage is a third-party GUI 
that allows the user to perform cyber actions through a comprehensive set of GUI options. 
It requires a thorough knowledge of the MSF, however, so a novice user can become 
overwhelmed with its various options and functions, making Armitage a less than ideal 
choice for the uninitiated. Conversely, the MSF Console (msfconsole), is an interactive 
command-line style interface that requires the user to be highly knowledgeable in MSF 
functionality. As such, being able to navigate the MSF functions in either interface can 
prove challenging for a user not well-versed in using MSF commands. The CARTT GUI 
eases this process for the novice user by automating the MSF commands to conduct a 
cyber-attack as part of a red teaming event. 
A. IMPLEMENTATION AND SETUP 
1. Backend Applications 
CARTT was built using a Python script to interface with the MSF database. Python 
is a user-friendly programming language that uses scripted code to automate commands in 
the MSF architecture. The original version of CARTT used Python scripted code to 
automate the network and vulnerability scans, then used Python to import the scanned 
results into the MSF [17]. This gave the user the ability to view and select a potential exploit 
target without needing in-depth knowledge of MSF functionality. 
The MSF requires initialization steps before using its exploit capability. It uses a 
backend relational database called Postgresql, which must be started and initialized before 
using MSF. Next the user can launch MSF from the Kali Linux command line by simply 
typing “msfconsole.” CARTT simplifies these setup steps by performing all of them with 
a single click of the “Initialize Metasploit Framework” GUI button. Of note, CARTT’s 
initialization button employs the “-q” command-line option when launching Metasploit, 
which starts msfconsole in “quiet” mode without displaying banner information such as 
MSF version, current number of exploit and payload modules, etc. 
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2. GUI Implementation 
As mentioned earlier (in Chapter II Section F), Tkinter was the GUI tool chosen for 
the CARTT architecture. Tkinter is an application programing interface (API) that is a part 
of the Python library. It is intuitive for the programmer, and easy to implement as a front-
end application for a comprehensive tool suite like MSF. For this research, Tkinter allowed 
us to develop a simple GUI that alleviated the need for the user to have extensive 
knowledge about MSF operations and command line interface actions to perform cyber-
attacks against a target. For more details regarding Tkinter, see Plot's thesis [17]. 
While developing the CARTT GUI, we wanted to keep the programming simple 
and easy to understand. For example, the GUI window size is set by a global variable in 
the code that is easily modifiable if additional features are required. This is done to support 
future expanded capability of CARTT. Other global variables established in Tkinter for the 
GUI are the type of FONT, FONT_SIZE, WIDTH, HEIGHT ROW, and COLUMN. Figure 
13 shows the global settings used for the test CARTT GUI. The current ROW and 
COLUMN settings provide an easy offset for adding additional labels, buttons and 
windows. The title and header labels are offset from these settings.  
 
Figure 13. CARTT GUI global setting 
The interface buttons, when clicked by the user, invoke an action through the 
CARTT GUI. The buttons are tied to two actions by the Python lambda function. When 
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clicked, each button initiates the corresponding action associated with the button, and the 
progress bar notifies the user that their action was registered on the CARTT GUI. In other 
words, the Python lambda function creates threads for multiple tasks to take place at the 
same time. The window features are implemented via a Tkinter interactive “ListboxSelect” 
widget. The user is allowed to scroll through a line of text and choose one item from the 
list. The window is configured to call a function that fetches the user's requested item. 
These features were chosen to make CARTT more user friendly. 
B. SYSTEM TESTING 
CARTT uses MSF commands to configure and execute cyber-attack actions. 
CARTT uses the “spool” command to copy the MSF output into a text file in the 
background. This text file is then parsed by the CARTT script for key vulnerability and 
exploit information, to be later displayed on the CARTT GUI. 
 At this point, the MSF is ready to receive information regarding vulnerable targets. 
The vulnerability report is imported into the MSF database with the “db_import *xml” 
command. For this testing, the OpenVAS vulnerability scan report was downloaded as an 
XML file, but MSF has the capability to import other file formats from well-known 
scanners, such as Nmap and Nessus. The MSF “vulns” command produces a list of the 
vulnerabilities for all hosts in the XML file. CARTT subsequently copies this output into 
the GUI's “Host Vulnerability Descriptions” window (see arrow in Figure 14). To find 
MSF exploit modules related to a particular vulnerability, CARTT combines the MSF 
keyword commands “name” and “type.” First, CARTT parses the text file for the 
description of the vulnerability. Again, these descriptions are displayed in Figure 14. For 
example, if a “Microsoft Windows Remote Desktop Service” vulnerability is selected by 
the user, CARTT will parse the file for the selected text. CARTT then combines the text 
with two of MSF keywords: “name” for the description, and “type” to return a module for 
the specific vulnerability description. This entire sequence of characters is then 
communicated to the MSF database at the command line interface. This combination is 
passed to the MSF database using the regular expression “search” attached to the CARTT 
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string value stored in a local variable called “search_cve.” Lastly, the search_cve local 
variable filters the type of module for CARTT's purpose —”exploit.” 
Figure 14. List of vulnerabilities inside CARTT GUI 
To display the actual description of the selected exploit module, CARTT places the 
“info” command at the beginning of the module's name. The output file of 126 lines is 
parsed and the resulting description is displayed in the CARTT “Module Description” 
window. Figure 15 shows the result from the command line query executed by CARTT. 
This is an important step in the process, as it provides detailed information about the exploit 
that may be of interest to the user, such as possible side effects of the exploit. Because a 
description length can range from one sentence to multiple lines, a scroll bar is provided to 
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the user for ease of viewing. If the user is satisfied with the exploit module, they may 
proceed to the next button — Exploit Setup. 
 
Figure 15. Description of ms08_067_netapi exploit module 
To setup an exploit, CARTT automates the execution of a series of otherwise 
manual steps and commands. The first step is for the MSF to configure the user-selected 
module for execution. CARTT combines the selected host and exploit module and inputs 
them into a scripted resources code. The resource code automates the input of the required 
exploit module parameters (remote host, local host, and payload). 
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CARTT automates this entire process with the click of the “Exploit Setup” button. 
Figure 16 shows the exploit status after the setup has been implemented.  
 
Figure 16. Exploit setup and preparation 
CARTT initiates the cyber-attack against the remote host target IP once the user 
clicks the “Run Exploit” button on the CARTT GUI. The user may terminate the exploit 
session at any time by clicking the “Terminate Session” button after an exploit has been 
initiated. When the exploit has completed, CARTT will inform the user that the session has 
ended, at which time the user may exit the program. 
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C. RESULTS 
For our implementation test, we used CARTT to target an unpatched Windows XP 
Service Pack 3 system with a known vulnerability identified as a Microsoft SMB server 
service relative path stack corruption. CARTT used this vulnerability to search MSF for a 
suitable exploit module and returned the exploit ms08_067_netapi. This module is ranked 
“great” by MSF and considered reliable based on the MSF ranking structure. Upon setup, 
CARTT displays that a Meterpreter reverse-tcp payload has been selected to couple with 
the exploit module. Also displayed to the CARTT user is confirmation of the attacker's 
local host (lhost) IP address and the target’s remote host (rhost) IP address. Initiation of the 
cyber-attack yielded an exploit and payload status stating that the reverse-tcp connection 
has been established, and that a Meterpreter session has opened. This indicates to the 
CARTT user that the exploitation against the targeted host was successful. At this point, 
the user may terminate the cyber-attack session and close the CARTT GUI.  
In summary, the msfconsole would require 5 manual commands to be entered at 
the command-line to conduct this cyber-attack. CARTT automated and simplified this 
process by reducing the steps required to two button clicks. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter described the MSF interfaces Armitage and msfconsole. It also 
described how a user can manually conduct a cyber-attack against a desired target. Finally, 
it demonstrated how CARTT automates the cyber-attack process making it easier for a 
non-expect user to perform the task with little experience. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. SUMMARY 
The goal of this thesis was to extend the CARTT capability in order to automate a 
cyber-attack scenario against a designated computer system. To that end, we expanded the 
user-friendly GUI to allow the user to select various scripted cyber-attacks based on 
previously identified vulnerabilities. We performed a test experiment using the prototype 
system against a Windows XP Service Pack 3 system. The test demonstrated that CARTT 
can import scanned vulnerabilities and allow users to execute cyber-attacks against those 
vulnerabilities on a targeted host. The portable prototype system was updated to provide 
real-time feedback that a non-expert user can understand. 
CARTT was implemented using the Python programming language, which makes 
it easy for follow-on programmers to further extend the capabilities of CARTT's front-end 
applications. The GUI design and the nature of the attack scripts allow CARTT to be used 
by operators who do not have extensive training in offensive cyber operations or red 
teaming. These benefits also address the well-known shortage of trained red teams for 
conducting security vulnerability assessments of cyber systems. 
This research aimed to contribute realistic value to DoD testing of computer 
systems. CARTT reduces the learning curve for red teaming by allowing effective and 
efficient vulnerability testing during acquisition and operational fielding of computer 
systems. CARTT is ideal for red team testing legacy systems currently deployed 
throughout DoD, specifically systems not connected to the internet. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
CARTT combines vulnerability scanning and red teaming into one tool for a more 
complete assessment. The vulnerability scanning is conducted against known cyber 
vulnerabilities. Conducting red team cyber-attacks is a proactive means of determining 
whether a previously identified vulnerability is valid and exploitable on a selected target. 
CARTT was developed, using the MSF open source software suite, as a proof of concept 
to demonstrate that a vulnerability can be validated as potentially exploitable on a target.  
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CARTT, by using the MSF suite of pen-testing tools, can have its exploit modules 
modified to potentially identify new system flaws known as zero days. However, this is 
something that would require red team assistance for the novice user. CARTT provides a 
low-cost method for organizations to establish a robust automated testing program for 
cyber systems. With CARTT as an asset to DoD, red teams will be able to focus their 
efforts on the growing capabilities of the most urgent adversaries. 
This research answered the following questions: 
1. Primary Question
How can the capability of the current Cyber Automated Red Team Tool (CARTT) 
be extended to enhance simulated Red Team attacks against specified computer systems 
not directly connected to an external network? 
We extended the previous CARTT prototype from an automated host discovery and 
vulnerability assessment tool to one that conducts scripted cyber-attacks against computer 
systems using the results of cyber reconnaissance. To support this, we expanded the GUI 
to provide the user with real time feedback in preparing and executing a cyber-attack. We 
demonstrated that the new prototype can successfully conduct a cyber-attack against a 
Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 3 machine. The XP machine had a well-known 
parsing flaw vulnerability in the Microsoft version API, known as ms08_067. CARTT, 
using an MSF exploit module, established a Meterpreter session on the vulnerable system, 
giving the user complete administrative access to the target system. We also extended the 
CARTT tool functionality by providing the user the option to select a follow-on exploit 
module or terminate the current cyber-attack at any time during the process.  
2. Secondary Question
How can the CARTT tool be designed so that a novice user can interact with it 
and understand the results? 
We expanded the CARTT GUI to provide the user with critical information and 
feedback throughout each phase of the red team cyber-attack process. For example, the 
user can scroll through the Host Vulnerability window in CARTT to view all target hosts' 
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vulnerabilities at once or select a particular host from the target list to view only the 
vulnerabilities associated with that specific host.  
The CARTT interface was also extended to provide the user a description of a 
selected exploit module. The user can review this information to determine if the exploit 
module will potentially yield the intended cyber effect. Lastly, CARTT was extended to 
provide the user with the status of the cyber-attack, confirming for the user the payload, 
exploit, and remote host information, as well as the cyber-attack success. 
Due to limited time availability to conduct this research, we could not conduct a 
study of user performance with the prototype system.  We, however, believe that we have 
made the process of conducting red team cyber-attacks significantly easier than the earlier 
manual, time-consuming, error-prone, and technically difficult process. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
CARTT offers many opportunities for future research. Future work should further 
expand the capability of CARTT to automate the entire cyber-attack scenario (i.e., cyber 
reconnaissance, vulnerability analysis, cyber-attack, and assessment) against computer 
systems. The following are recommendations to work toward that goal. 
1. Perform Vulnerability Scans from within the CARTT 
CARTT currently launches the OpenVAS GSA GUI from the MSF command line. 
As a result, the vulnerability scans are conducted outside of the CARTT GUI. The user is 
required to manually upload the list of hosts discovered by CARTT into the OpenVAS 
GUI. Future work should configure CARTT to automate such vulnerability scans from 
within the MSF for the user and provide feedback on the results. This allows the user to 
only have to interact with one GUI tool. 
2. Multiple Attack Vectors 
The work in this thesis was a prototype proof of concept, thus it was kept simple 
with one attacker and one target in a virtual environment. Future work should research the 
possibility of CARTT conducting multiple attacks against potentially multiple targets in a 
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single session. Additionally, researchers should consider testing CARTT on real-world 
systems connected to the Internet, which would need to address network security policies, 
firewalls, etc. 
3. Software Updates 
In this thesis, CARTT used a known exploit module against a known vulnerability. 
A limitation of CARTT is its inability to simulate a red team’s ability to “maneuver on the 
fly” and adapt to a changing situation. Further research should determine an effective and 
reliable method for CARTT to receive software updates to keep pace with the latest 
vulnerabilities discovered on target systems. One method is for red teams to develop 
software that can be uploaded to CARTT for testing against targets. 
4. Improved Performance 
This thesis focused on CARTT functionality, specifically whether it could execute 
a cyber-attack. Future work should focus on improving CARTT performance regarding 
speed of execution and feedback. Research may begin by looking into the NPS cyber battle 
lab and the Kali Linux suite performance. For example, would the CARTT performance 
improve if executed in a new environment. The Tkinter GUI interface and MSF are other 
areas that future work can investigate for possible optimization. 
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